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Abstract 
Five experiments (N = 1710) demonstrate the central role of knowledge attributions in social 
evaluations. In Experiments 1-3, we manipulated whether an agent believes, is certain of, or knows 
a true proposition and asked people to rate whether the agent should perform a variety of actions. 
We found that knowledge, more so than belief or certainty, leads people to judge that the agent 
should act. In Experiments 4-5, we investigated whether attributions of knowledge or certainty can 
explain an important finding on how people act based on statistical evidence, known as “the Wells 
effect.” We found that knowledge attributions, but not certainty attributions, mediate this effect on 
decision-making. 
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Knowledge Central: 
A Central Role for Knowledge Attributions in Social Evaluations 
 
As social beings, people are motivated to gather and retain information about others, including 
information about their mental states. People give particular attention to others’ knowledge states. 
“Know” is the most frequently used mental state verb in the English language, more common than 
even “think” and “want,” in both adults and children 
(http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/words/the-oec-facts-about-the-language; Shatz, Wellman & 
Silber, 1983). People have two broad methods for judging what others know. First, they base these 
judgments on detailed information about an agent’s circumstances, such as information about 
which kinds of evidence the agent has accessed (e.g., Buckwalter, 2014; Pratt & Bryant, 1990; 
Sodian, 1988; Sodian & Wimmer, 1987; Starmans & Friedman, 2012; Turri, Buckwalter & Blouw, 
2014; Turri & Friedman, 2014; Turri 2014; Wimmer, Hogrefe & Perner, 1988; Woolley & 
Wellman, 1993). Second, people also base these judgments on general expectations about what 
others are likely to know (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2003; Brennan & Williams, 1995; Fussell & 
Krauss, 1991, 1992; Lau, Chiu & Hong, 2001; Nickerson, Baddeley & Freeman, 1987; Thomas & 
Jacoby, 2013). For instance, children expect generic information to be more broadly known than 
specific information (Cimpian & Scott, 2012).  
What are the consequences of attributing knowledge to others? Previous research suggests 
that knowledge attributions affect several kinds of social evaluation, including moral judgments, 
decisions about whom to trust, and decisions about how to interpret others’ behavior (e.g., 
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Schroeder & Linder, 1976; Sobel, 2009; Young & Saxe, 2011; Yuill & Perner, 1988).1 For instance, 
one series of studies compared the effects of belief, knowledge, and certainty on decisions about 
whom to trust (Furrow & Moore, 1990; Moore, Pure & Furrow, 1990). Participants were asked to 
find an object while one agent said, “I know it is in the red box,” and another said, “I think/am 
sure it is in the blue box.” Participants were more likely to look in the red box, suggesting that 
attributions of knowledge imply greater certainty than certain other kinds of self-attributions. In 
this paper, we examine another possible consequence of attributing knowledge. We examine 
whether these attributions play an important role in judgments about whether agents are licensed 
to act.  
There are often limits on whether people should act on their beliefs. For instance, suppose 
that some friends are at the beach. The health department recently tested the beach water and 
declared it dangerously unsafe. Even if the friends think the water is safe, this might not license 
them to take down a sign stating that the water is hazardous, or to encourage other people to swim 
in it. Limits on whether actions are licensed are particularly important in legal and medical 
decision-making — they determine whether a juror may vote to convict a defendant he thinks is 
guilty, and whether a doctor should undertake a risky medical intervention that she thinks will help 
a patient.  
One factor that might license action is certainty, or one’s confidence that a particular 
 
1 Much of this research has compared knowledge to ignorance rather than to other representational mental states, such 
as belief or certainty. One concern with this approach is that the difference between knowledge and ignorance is stark 
and does not isolate knowledge per se. Someone with a true belief about a topic is not ignorant, yet not all true beliefs 
are viewed as knowledge (Starmans & Friedman, 2012). A further concern is that people make inferences about belief 
and certainty from knowledge judgments. People infer that someone who knows a proposition also believes it 
(Buckwalter, Rose & Turri, 2013), and people expect that someone who knows is extremely confident (Wesson & 
Pulford, 2009). If people are likely to infer belief or certainty from knowledge, then to isolate what knowledge 
attributions contribute to social evaluations, we should compare the effects of knowledge to those of certainty and 
belief. 
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conclusion is true. If the friends are extremely confident that the water is safe, or the juror is 
especially certain of the plaintiff’s guilt, perhaps this licenses them to act. But confidence in a 
conclusion may not always suffice. For instance, Wells (1992) demonstrated that mock jurors make 
different liability judgments across conditions where they assigned equal probability to a 
defendant’s guilt (also see Niedermeier, Kerr & Messé, 1999 and Wright, MacEachern, Stoffer & 
MacDonald, 1996). Instead, participants’ willingness to convict the defendant depended on the 
nature of the evidence suggesting that the defendant was guilty. 
We propose that knowledge attributions might have a privileged role in licensing actions. 
When an agent is viewed as knowing some fact, as opposed to believing or being certain of it, 
people might be more likely to view the agent as licensed to act. One reason to expect this is that 
knowledge requires an agent’s conclusion to be based on evidence connecting the agent’s 
representation to the world in some appropriate way (Friedman & Turri, 2015; Starmans & 
Friedman, 2012). This connection to evidence might differentiate knowledge from belief and 
certainty, because these latter states might occur with weaker or less direct evidence. Broadly 
consistent with this, people often deny that agents are knowledgeable about some conclusion, even 
when they are extremely confident that it is true. For instance, in one study, participants denied 
that a woman knew that her lottery ticket was a loser, even though she concluded this after learning 
that it only had a 1-in-10,000,000 odds of being a winner (Friedman & Turri, 2015).  
We tested whether knowledge plays this role in two quite different ways. In Experiments 
1-3, participants read vignettes in which an agent believes, is certain of, or knows a relevant true 
proposition. Then participants rated whether the agent should perform a variety of actions. We 
found that knowledge, more so than belief or certainty, leads people to judge that the agent should 
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act. In Experiments 4-5, we provided a more specific test of whether knowledge is privileged in 
licensing action. We investigated whether attributions of knowledge or certainty can explain the 
“Wells effect” (Niedermeier, Kerr & Messé, 1999; Wells 1992; Wright, MacEachern, Stoffer & 
MacDonald, 1996), in which different forms of statistical evidence produce qualitatively different 
decisions about how one should act on evidence (e.g., whether a defendant should be convicted), 
despite inducing equivalent subjective probability estimates of the relevant underlying facts. We 
found that certainty attributions do not mediate this effect, whereas knowledge attributions do. 
This suggests that the different forms of statistical evidence produce different judgments about 
whether one is licensed to act because they produce different knowledge judgments. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Five hundred ninety-eight adult U.S. residents were tested (aged 18-68 years, mean 
age = 31; 96% reporting English as a native language; 236 female). Participants were recruited 
and tested online using Amazon Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics and compensated $0.40 for 
approximately 2-3 minutes of their time. Repeat participation was prevented by screening Amazon 
Mechanical Turk Worker IDs, which are uniquely identifying in the population sampled. The same 
recruitment procedures were used in all the experiments reported here. Eighty participants failed 
a comprehension question and were excluded from the analysis, but including them does not 
change the pattern of results reported below.  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were assigned to one of twelve conditions in a 4 
(Cover Story: Beach, Bagel, Restaurant, Carnival) × 3 (Mental State: Think, Know, Certain) 
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between-subjects design. Each participant read a single story, responded to a set of test and 
comprehension questions, then filled out a brief demographic survey. 
We tested four cover stories to ensure that any findings were not due to incidental features 
of any one scenario or subject matter. Otherwise, we had no expectations for the Cover Story factor. 
The Beach story concerned a woman who visits a beach, learns that the water was recently declared 
unsafe, examines the water herself, and concludes that it is actually safe. The Bagel story 
concerned a woman who shops for food, reads a warning that the bagels may contain nuts, 
examines the bagels, and concludes that they do not contain nuts. The Restaurant story concerned 
a woman who enters a restaurant, reads that the bread is trans-fat-free, but concludes that the bread 
contains trans-fat. Finally, the Carnival story concerns a man who visits a carnival, gets in line for 
the Ferris wheel, then concludes that the Ferris wheel is unsafe. 
The Mental State factor varied how the agent’s conclusion was described. In the Think 
conditions, the agent “thinks” that the conclusion is true; in the Know conditions, the agent 
“knows” that it is true; and in the Certain conditions, the agent “is certain” that it is true. In all 
stories, the agent’s conclusion is in fact true. Also, in all stories, the agent came to the mental state 
after briefly examining the object or setting that the mental state concerned. It might seem odd that 
brief examination could allow an agent to know or be certain of facts such as whether water is safe 
to swim in, or whether bagels contain nuts. However, there is an advantage to specifying this: it 
reduces the possibility of participants making assumptions about the manner in which the agent 
examined the object (or assumptions about the information gained from this examination) based 
on the agent’s resulting mental state. For instance, it reduces the possibility of participants 
imagining that the examination was longer or more detailed when the agent came to know, 
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compared with when the agent instead came to believe.  
A supplemental file includes the complete text of all stimuli, but to give readers a sense of 
the materials, here is the Beach story (Mental State manipulations bracketed and separated by a 
slash): 
The water at Metro Beach was recently tested and declared unsafe for swimming. 
However, although it is difficult to tell, the health department botched the test and, as a 
matter of fact, the water is perfectly safe for swimming. It’s a hot summer day and Alicia 
decides to go to Metro beach. She briefly examines the water, and now she 
[thinks/knows/is certain] that the water is safe for swimming. 
After reading the story, participants rated their agreement with several test statements about 
whether the agent should perform certain actions, given that the agent had drawn the relevant 
conclusion. For example, after reading the Beach story, participants were instructed, “Given that 
Alicia [thinks/knows/is certain] that the water is safe for swimming, please rate your agreement 
with each of the following statements:” 
1. Alicia should go swimming. 
2. Alicia should allow her children to go swimming. 
3. Alicia should encourage other people at the beach to go swimming. 
4. Alicia should tell other people at the beach that the water is safe for swimming. 
5. Alicia should remove the sign at the beach that says the water is unsafe for 
swimming. 
6. Alicia should tell the health department that their test results were wrong. 
The order of statements was randomized. Responses were collected on a standard 7-point Likert 
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scale, 1 strongly disagree – 7 strongly agree, left-to-right on the participant’s screen. 
After responding to the test statements, participants went to a new screen where they 
answered a comprehension question (response options rotated randomly) and rated how sure the 
agent was of the conclusion (e.g., “How sure is Alicia that the beach water is safe?”) on a 7-point 
Likert scale, 1 not at all sure – 7 completely sure. Participants could not return to a previous screen 
to change their answers. 
Results 
Preliminary analysis revealed that neither participant age nor participant gender affected response 
to the test statements. The same is true for all the experiments reported here. We will not discuss 
these demographic variables further. 
We will focus on mean evaluation scores. For each participant, we calculated a mean 
evaluation score by summing the value of their response to each test statements and then dividing 
by the total number of statements. (See the supplemental file for a table with statistics for each 
dependent measure.) Higher mean evaluation scores indicate stronger agreement that the agent 
should engage in the relevant activities. 
An analysis of variance revealed that mean evaluation score was affected by Cover Story, 
F(3, 506) = 96.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .363; Mental State, F(2, 506) = 28.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .101; and 
their interaction, F(6, 506) = 2.34, p = .031, ηp2 = .027; all tests two-tailed. (See Figure 1.) Mean 
evaluation score was higher for Know than for Think for each cover story. (See Table 1.) Mean 
evaluation score was higher for Know than for Certain in the Beach story and showed a strong 
trend in this direction in the Bagel story (i.e., p = .051), but it did not differ in the Carnival and 
Restaurant stories. For the Beach story, confidence ratings were no different for Know (M = 5.64, 
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SD = 1.43) and Certain (M = 5.75, SD = 1.62), independent samples t-tests, t(87) = -0.33, p = .745. 
Similarly, for the Bagel story, confidence ratings were no different for Know (M = 5.65, SD = 1.48) 
and Certain (M = 5.75, SD = 1.87), t(74) = -0.26, p = .796. Thus, the higher mean evaluation scores 
for knowledge cannot be due to a difference in perceived confidence. 
 
Figure 1. Experiment 1. Mean evaluation scores. Scales ran 1(SD) – 7 (SA). Error bars represent 
+/- one standard error of the mean. 
Table 1. Experiment 1. Mean evaluation scores (MES). All tests 2-tailed. 
Measure Mean (SD) Know vs. Think t-test Know vs Certain t-test 
 Think Know Certain t df p t df p 
Beach n = 43 n = 45 n = 44       
   MES 3.02 (1.38) 4.52 (1.30) 3.69 (1.50) 5.30 86 <.001 2.81 87 .006 
Bagel n = 28 n = 40 n = 36       
   MES 2.85 ( 1.17) 3.99 (1.59) 3.31 (1.39) 3.21 66 .002 1.97 74 .051 
Restaurant n = 44 n = 48 n = 48       
   MES 4.86 (0.88) 5.30 (0.87) 5.25 (0.99) 2.38 90 .019 0.22 94 .827 
Carnival n = 45 n = 49 n = 48       
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   MES 4.96 (0.87) 5.70 (0.87) 5.65 (0.86) 4.06 92 <.001 0.26 95 .799 
  
Discussion 
The results support the hypothesis that knowledge attributions play an important role in social 
evaluations. People consistently judged that knowledge licenses action more readily than true 
belief. The comparison between knowledge and certainty was more mixed. For two of the 
scenarios we tested, Beach and Bagel, people judged that knowledge licensed action more readily 
than certainty. But for the other two scenarios, Restaurant and Carnival, people judged knowledge 
and certainty to be equally good for licensing action. One explanation for this difference lies in the 
type of risk faced by the agent. 
In the Beach and Bagel stories, greater risk resides in acting on the conclusion. For 
example, when Alicia convinces others that the beach water is safe, she faces the risk that she is 
wrong, and that heeding her advice will lead others to be sick; but if she keeps quiet about her 
conclusion, the worst possible outcome is that people will lose the opportunity to go in the water. 
By contrast, in the Restaurant and Carnival stories, greater risk resides in not acting on the 
conclusion. For instance, if the protagonist in Carnival does not act on his concern about the safety 
of the Ferris wheel, others could be seriously injured or killed; but if he acts and warns others, he 
only risks inconveniencing people while they wait for a mechanic to double-check the ride. One 
possibility, then, is that knowledge and certainty are equally good for licensing action when the 
risk resides in not acting while being right, whereas knowledge is superior when the risk resides 
in acting and being wrong. The next experiment tests this possibility. 
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Four hundred seven new participants were tested (aged 18-74 years, mean age = 32 
years; 95% reporting English as a native language; 157 female). Fifty-seven participants failed a 
comprehension question and were excluded from the analysis, but including them does not change 
the pattern of results reported below.  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were assigned to one of eight conditions in a 2 
(Cover Story: Beach, Bagel) × 2 (Mental State: Know, Certain) × 2 (Risk: Not Acting, Acting) 
between-subjects design. The testing procedures were the same as in Experiment 1. The Mental 
State factor varied knowledge and certainty the same way as in Experiment 1. The basic Beach 
story was the same as in Experiment 1; the Bagel story was slightly modified to make the Risk 
manipulation more natural. The Risk factor varied whether the serious risk lay in not acting while 
being right, or acting and being wrong. For instance, in the Beach story for the Not Acting 
condition, the beach water was officially declared safe but the agent concludes that it is unsafe. By 
contrast, in the story for the Acting condition, the beach water is officially declared unsafe but the 
agent concludes that it is safe. In the Bagel story for the Not Acting condition, the bagels are 
labeled as nut-free but the agent concludes that they contain nuts. By contrast, in the story for the 
Acting condition, the bagels are labeled as containing nuts but the agent concludes that they are 
nut-free. 
Results 
Table 2 summarizes the findings. In the main text, we will again focus on mean evaluation scores 
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(see the Results section of Experiment 1 for an explanation of this). (See the supplemental file for 
a table with statistics for each dependent measure.) A two-way analysis of variance revealed that 
mean evaluation score was affected by Mental State F(1, 344) = 8.04, p =.005, ηp2 = .023, Risk, 
F(1, 344) = 264.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .435, and an interaction between Mental State and Risk, F(1, 
344) = 13.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .038. For each cover story, when the risk lay in not acting, mean 
evaluation scores for knowledge and certainty did not differ, but when the risk lay in acting, mean 
evaluation scores were higher for knowledge than for certainty. (See Figure 2, Table 2.) As in 
Experiment 1, higher mean evaluation scores for knowledge cannot be attributed to greater 
perceived confidence. For the Beach story, when the risk lay in acting, confidence ratings were no 
different for Know (M = 5.67, SD = 1.27) and Certain (M = 5.73, SD = 1.66), independent samples 
t-test, t(84) = -0.16, p = .872. Similarly, for the Bagel story, when the risk lay in not acting, 
confidence ratings were no different for Know (M = 6.06, SD = 1.00) and Certain (M = 6.21, SD 
= 1.30), t(70) = -0.52, p = .604. 
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Figure 2. Experiment 2. Mean evaluation scores. Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the 
mean. 
 
Table 2. Experiment 2. Mean evaluation scores (MES). All tests 2-tailed. 
 Not Acting Acting 
 Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)    
Measure Know Certain T df p Know Certain t df p 
Beach n = 49 n = 48    n = 46 n = 40    
   MES 5.95 (0.81) 6.02 (0.94) -0.37 95 .715 4.16 (1.36) 3.52 (1.30) 2.22 84 .029 
Bagel n = 45 n = 52    n = 33 n = 39    
   MES 5.67 (1.13) 5.81 (0.91) -0.69 95 .489 4.29 (1.51) 3.30 (1.42) 2.88 70 .005 
Discussion 
In light of the results from Experiment 1, we examined whether the difference between knowledge 
and certainty for licensing action occurs when the risk resides in acting but being wrong, but not 
when risk resides in not acting while being right. The results from the present experiment support 
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this hypothesis. Evaluations were affected by a significant interaction between the agent’s mental 
state and the type of risk faced by the agent. More specifically, evaluation scores were equally high 
for knowledge and certainty when the risk lay in not acting while being right, but they were higher 
for knowledge when the risk lay in acting but being wrong. 
One possible explanation of these findings is that they might reflect a ceiling effect. As can 
be seen in Figure 2 and Table 2, when the risk lay in not acting (while being right), mean evaluation 
scores were very high and close to the maximum possible score of 7. Hence, any differences 
between knowledge and certainty might have been masked by participants giving the highest 
ratings they were willing to give for the particular evaluations requested. Perhaps differences 
would be revealed for these items if we used a more sensitive scale. 
One possible concern with some of the materials tested up until now is that it might seem 
odd to attribute knowledge or certainty to an agent based on, say, a brief examination of the water. 
One might wonder, then, whether we would observe a difference between knowledge and certainty 
when both mental states are based on good evidence, such as testing the water with a portable kit.2 
The next experiment addresses this concern. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. Ninety-nine new participants were tested (aged 18-69 years, mean age = 34 years; 
97% reporting English as a native language; 49 female). Data was not collected from one recruit 
 
2 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this variation of the case. 
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who did not sign the consent form. 
Materials and Procedure. Participants were assigned to one of two conditions (Know, 
Certain) in a between-subjects design. The materials and procedures were similar to the beach 
stories from Experiment 2 when the risk resides in acting but being wrong. The main difference 
was that instead of ending with the sentence, “She briefly examines the water, and now she 
[knows/is certain] that the water is safe for swimming,” the text ended with, “She tests the water 
with a portable kit. Based on the results, she [knows/is certain] that the water is safe.” 
Results 
Independent samples t-tests showed that mean evaluation score was significantly higher in the 
Know condition (M = 4.47, SD = 1.13) than in the Certain condition (M = 3.74, SD = 1.25). 
Moreover, for each individual evaluative item, mean agreement was either significantly higher or 
trending higher in the Know condition. (See the supplemental file for a table with statistics for 
each dependent measure.) 
Discussion 
This experiment tested whether knowledge would license action more than certainty when the 
agent’s mental state was based on stronger evidence. We found that knowledge did license action 
more than certainty when this occurred. Indeed, although we did not directly test this possibility, 
the results suggest that making the agent’s evidence stronger might actually lead to an ever greater 
advantage for knowledge compared to certainty. 
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Experiment 4 
The findings from Experiments 1-3 suggest that knowledge licenses action more than true belief 
and certainty. In this experiment, we took a different approach to investigating the role of 
knowledge in licensing action. We examined whether attributions of knowledge explain the Wells 
effect (Niedermeier, Kerr & Messé, 1999; Wells 1992; Wright, MacEachern, Stoffer & 
MacDonald, 1996), in which people’s judgments about how to act on evidence (e.g., whether to 
convict a defendant) depend on the nature of the evidence. Specifically, we examined whether 
attributions of knowledge mediate this effect. 
Wells (1992) demonstrated that mock jurors make different liability judgments across 
conditions where they assign equal probability to the defendant’s guilt. Suppose that Smith’s dog 
was hit by a bus but no one witnessed the accident. In one version of the case, jurors learn that 
80% of the buses operating in the town belonged to the Blue Bus Company, and 20% belonged to 
the Grey Bus Company. People estimate that it is 80% likely that a Blue bus killed the dog, but 
they tend to disagree that the jury should find the Blue Bus Company liable. In another version of 
the case, jurors learn that shortly before the accident, a weigh station attendant made a log entry 
on the bus that eventually killed the dog. The log says, “Blue bus.” It is known that 80% of “Blue 
bus” entries in the log correctly identify a Blue bus, and 20% incorrectly identify a Grey bus. Again 
people estimate that it is 80% likely that a Blue bus killed the dog, and they tend to agree that the 
jury should find the Blue Bus Company liable.  
Related to this finding is the “gatecrasher paradox” (Cohen, 1981): if 95% of attendees 
snuck into the rodeo without paying, then why cannot the rodeo organizers sue a random attendee 
for non-payment? More generally related is the preference for “clinical” to “statistical” decision 
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procedures. In all of these examples, people are more willing to base decisions and actions on 
“observations” specific to the case at hand rather than empirically established statistics, even when 
decades of scientific evidence show that relying on the statistics produces better results (Dawes, 
Faust & Meehl, 1989, p. 1673; see also Dawes, 1996; Meehl, 1954). 
One way to unify these findings draws on the distinction between “inside” and “outside” 
probability judgments (Lagnado & Sloman, 2004). “Inside” probabilistic information is specific 
to the case at hand (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). For example, the weigh station attendant entered 
information about the very bus that hit the dog. “Outside” probabilistic information is generic and 
concerns distributions of properties or patterns. For example, a certain percentage of buses 
operating in town that day belonged to the Blue Bus Company. The attendant’s log book and the 
distribution of buses each makes it likely that a Blue bus hit the dog, but only the former does so 
from the “inside.” People are less likely to judge that the company is liable based on “outside” 
evidence. 
Interestingly, the outside/inside difference also affects knowledge judgments (Friedman & 
Turri, 2015). People are more likely to attribute knowledge when an agent has inside evidence 
(i.e., evidence specific to the case at hand), compared with when the agent has outside evidence 
(i.e., evidence concerning a larger set of cases). This suggests an intriguing possibility consistent 
with the findings from Experiments 1-3: the outside/inside difference might affect judgments about 
how people are licensed to act because it affects judgments about what they know. That is, 
knowledge judgments might mediate the outside/inside effect on judgments about how people 
should behave. The present experiment examines this question. 
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Method 
Participants. Three hundred two new participants were tested (aged 18-69 years, mean age = 32 
years; 93% reporting English as a native language; 114 female). 
Materials and Procedure. Participants were assigned to one of six conditions in a 3 (Story: 
Cab, Tumor, Rodeo) × 2 (Probability: Outside, Inside) between-subjects design. We had no 
expectations for the Story factor and included it to cover multiple scenarios familiar from the 
literature on outside/inside judgments. The Cab story was a simplified adaptation of Wells’s 
original example about a lawsuit involving a motor vehicle destroying someone’s belongings. The 
Tumor story is an example of an important medical decision made in a clinical context. The Rodeo 
story is a simplified version of the “gatecrasher paradox” story. The Probability factor varied 
whether the probability pertained to the case at hand (Inside) or generic distributional information 
(Outside). 
After reading the story, participants rated their agreement with a knowledge attribution and 
a statement about what the agent should decide to do. The order of the two statements was rotated 
randomly and responses were collected on a standard 7-point Likert scale, 1 strongly disagree – 7 
strongly agree, left-to-right on the participant’s screen. Participants then went to a new screen and 
rated the probability of the relevant proposition, expressed as a percentage between one and one-
hundred percent. The supplemental file contains all the stories and questions, but to give readers a 
sense of the materials, here are the story and questions for the Cab condition (Probability 
manipulation bracketed and separated by a slash): 
(Cab) Gary is suing the Blue Cab Company. Gary’s prize-winning rose garden was 
destroyed by a taxi cab that drove on to his front lawn. During the trial, jurors learned 
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that only two cab companies operate in the town: the Blue Cab Company and the Green 
Cab Company. According to a computerized analysis of the video footage from when 
Gary’s garden was destroyed, [80% of cabs on the road were Blue Cabs/the cab was 
80% likely to be a Blue Cab]. 
1. The jurors should rule against the Blue Cab Company and make them pay damages to 
Gary. 
2. The jurors know that a Blue Cab destroyed Gary’s garden. 
3. How probable is it that a Blue Cab destroyed Gary’s garden? 
Results 
Table 3 summarizes the findings. For each cover story, knowledge judgments and “should” 
judgments were higher for inside probability than for outside probability, but estimations of the 
relevant proposition’s probability did not differ. (See Table 3.) To test whether knowledge 
judgments mediated the effect of Probability on “should” judgments, for each Story we conducted 
a bootstrap mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) with Probability as the independent variable, 
response to the “should” statement as the outcome variable, and knowledge judgments as potential 
mediator. In each case, knowledge judgments completely mediated the effect of Probability on the 
outcome. (See Figure 3.) For Cab, the 95% confidence interval for the direct effect was -0.26 to 
0.78, and for the indirect effect it was 0.24 to 1.21. For Tumor, the 95% confidence interval for the 
direct effect was -0.22 to 0.72, and for the indirect effect it was 0.08 to 0.69. For Rodeo, the 95% 
confidence interval for the direct effect was -0.15 to 1.13, and for the indirect effect it was 0.09 to 
0.98. 
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Figure 3. Experiment 4. Mediation results for the three stories (Cab, Tumor and Rodeo). 
Parenthetical values represent the strength of a simple regression between the two variables; values 
outside the parentheses represent the strength of the relationships in a model used to test for 
mediation. *p < .025, **p < .001. 
 
Table 3. Experiment 4. Summary of findings. All tests 2-tailed. 
 Mean (SD)  
Measure Outside Inside t df p 
Cab n = 51 n = 49    
   know 2.96 (1.91) 4.02 (1.68) -2.95 98 .004 
   should 3.61 (1.73) 4.55 (1.66) -2.78 98 .007 
   probable 78.02 (11.14) 76.84 (13.76) 0.47 98 .638 
Tumor n = 50 n = 50    
   know 3.20 (1.95) 4.18 (1.54) -2.79 92.78 .006 
   should 5.10 (1.39) 5.67 (1.11) -2.27 97 .025 
   probable 78.70 (9.84) 75.71 (15.00) 1.17 97 .243 
Rodeo n = 51 n = 52    
   know 4.29 (1.93) 5.13 (1.93) -2.41 101 .018 
   should 3.78 (1.95) 4.75 (1.78) -2.62 101 .010 
   probable 88.02 (17.93) 89.06 (17.35) -0.30 101 .766 
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Discussion 
Prior work has shown that the difference between inside and outside probability affects how people 
evaluate decisions and actions. This experiment tested the hypothesis that the outside/inside 
difference affects decision evaluations because it affects knowledge judgments. The results support 
the hypothesis. Across three very different scenarios, knowledge judgments completely mediated 
the outside/inside effect on evaluations of decisions and actions. The next experiment tests whether 
certainty attributions also mediate this effect. 
Before proceeding, we will address a question about how to interpret the mediation result 
from the present experiment. Our analyses assumed a “knowledge model” whereby assignment to 
condition affects knowledge attributions, which in turn affect evaluative judgments. But there is 
an alternative “evaluative model” whereby assignment to condition affects evaluative judgments, 
which in turn affect knowledge judgments, perhaps as a post-hoc rationalization for the evaluative 
judgment.3 It turns out that both mediation models are statistically significant, but overall the ratio 
of indirect to total effect is larger for the knowledge model (.526 [.289, .939], κ2 = .128) than for 
the evaluative model (.438 [.244, .762], κ2 = .117). (Preacher & Kelly, 2011 introduce the κ2 
[“kappa-squared”] effect size for mediation models.) This suggests that the knowledge model better 
fits the current data. However, the ratios are still sufficiently similar that we are not willing to 
 
3 We thank Associate Editor James Hampton for proposing this alternative. 
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confidently reject the evaluative model. Instead, we note that if the evaluative model turns out to 
be correct, it would still support the conclusion that knowledge attributions play an important role 
in social evaluations. For if the evaluative model is correct, then a natural explanation for this is 
that people are implicitly sensitive to the role that knowledge plays in licensing action, which 
motivates them to alter their knowledge attributions as a post-hoc justification. 
Experiment 5 
Method 
Participants. Three hundred four new participants were tested (aged 18-69 years, mean age = 33 
years; 93% reporting English as a native language; 129 female). 
Materials and Procedure. The materials and procedures were the same as in Experiment 
4, except that instead of judging whether the agent “knows” the relevant proposition, participants 
judged whether the agent “is certain.” 
Results 
Table 4 summarizes the findings. For each cover story, “should” judgments were higher for inside 
probability than for outside probability; for Car and Rodeo, this difference passed the conventional 
threshold for statistical significance (p < .05), whereas for Tumor the difference was trending in 
the predicted direction (p = .059).4 By contrast, neither certainty attributions nor estimations of the 
relevant proposition’s probability differed significantly between inside and outside probability. To 
 
4 In keeping with all the other statistical reporting in this paper, this is the result of a two-tailed 
test, even though, in light of prior findings, we are entitled to a directional prediction. For a one-
tailed test, the difference passes the conventional threshold for statistical significance. 
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test whether certainty judgments mediated the effect of Probability on “should” judgments, for 
each Story we conducted a bootstrap mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) with Probability as the 
independent variable, response to the “should” statement as the outcome variable, and certainty 
judgment as potential mediator. In each case, certainty judgments failed to mediate the effect of 
Probability on the outcome. For Cab, the 95% confidence interval for the direct effect was 0.08 to 
0.88, and for the indirect effect it was -0.27 to 0.78. For Tumor, the 95% confidence interval for 
the direct effect was -0.04 to 0.82, and for the indirect effect it was -0.07 to 0.20. For Rodeo, the 
95% confidence interval for the direct effect was 0.43 to 1.53, and for the indirect effect it was -
0.14 to 0.69. 
 
Table 4. Experiment 5. Summary of findings. All tests 2-tailed. 
 Mean (SD)  
Measure Outside Inside t df p 
Cab n = 51 n = 50    
   certain 3.37 (1.92) 3.72 (1.68) -0.97 99 .335 
   should 3.82 (1.72) 4.56 (1.64) -2.20 99 .030 
   probable 74.90 (14.23) 75.76 (14.51) -0.30 99 .765 
Tumor n = 50 n = 52    
   certain 3.58 (1.79) 3.81 (1.73) -0.66 100 .514 
   should 5.34 (1.04) 5.77 (1.22) -1.91 100 .059 
   probable 77.66 (9.77) 80.19 (3.70) -1.71 62.31 .091 
Rodeo n = 51 n = 50    
   certain 4.20 (1.76) 4.60 (1.68) -1.18 99 .240 
   should 3.69 (1.91) 4.90 (1.45) -3.60 93.03 <.001 
   probable 84.61 (21.97) 88.12 (17.96) -0.88 99 .382 
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Discussion 
Whereas the results from Experiment 4 provided evidence that knowledge judgments mediate the 
outside/inside effect on evaluations of decisions and actions, the results from this experiment failed 
to find evidence that certainty judgments mediate this effect. Taken together, the results from these 
two experiments support the conclusion that this effect occurs because of knowledge judgments 
but not because of certainty judgments. 
General Discussion 
The findings of five experiments show that knowledge attributions play an important role in 
judging that agents are licensed to act. In Experiments 1-3, we found that knowledge licenses 
action more than certainty or belief. Experiment 2 also found that differences between knowledge 
and certainty can depend on the type of risk faced by the agent. In situations where action carried 
greater risks than inaction, participants were more likely to judge that knowledgeable agents 
should act compared with agents who were certain; however, when the risks of inaction were 
greater than the risks of action, judgments for knowledge and certainty did not differ. 
In Experiments 4-5, we found that knowledge attributions help to explain judgments about 
whether people should make decisions based on probabilistic evidence. Previous work showed 
that people are reluctant to endorse legal and medical decisions based on probabilistic evidence 
when this requires taking an “outside view” (i.e., judging a particular instance from information 
about a distribution) rather than an “inside view” (i.e., considering probabilistic evidence 
specifically concerning the case at hand). For instance, based on distributional information, people 
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are unwilling to say that a cab company is liable for an accident. Similarly, clinicians are often 
unwilling to make decisions or recommendations based on distributional information. In 
Experiment 4, we found that people’s knowledge attributions entirely mediated the outside/inside 
effect on their evaluation of legal and medical decisions, whereas in Experiment 5, we found that 
people’s certainty attributions did not mediate this effect. Together these findings demonstrate a 
central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations. 
These findings are interesting given that concepts like belief, certainty, and knowledge are 
closely connected, especially when they concern the same true proposition. People typically judge 
that knowledge requires true belief (Buckwalter, Rose & Turri, 2013; Starmans & Friedman, 
2012), and previous findings and our present results suggest that people are often willing to infer 
that someone is certain of a proposition when they know it (Wesson & Pulford, 2009; Experiment 
1 above). Close relations between these concepts may explain why research on “theory of mind” 
has been unclear about differences between how people consider knowledge and true belief in 
predicting the behavior of agents. For instance, attributing either mental state can be used to 
explain an agent’s correct search for an object (i.e., she knew where it was, or she had a true belief 
about this). The present studies therefore advance understanding by showing that people do view 
these mental states as having different consequences for behavior. Whereas the present 
experiments demonstrated this by asking about which actions agents should perform based on their 
mental states, future research could examine whether these differences extend to predictions and 
explanations of actions. 
The findings also suggest that knowledge attributions can play a pivotal role in legal and 
medical decision-making. For instance, in considering whether someone should be held liable for 
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harm, jurors might first ask themselves whether they know that the person is guilty. Before 
endorsing the decision made by another practitioner, a doctor might ask whether the practitioner 
knows that surgery is required. And before granting parole, a parole board might ask whether the 
clinician knows that the convict is rehabilitated. We emphasize that these are descriptive 
hypotheses about the role of knowledge attributions in legal and medical decision-making, not 
necessarily normative claims about how such decisions should be made. 
Finally, we end with a hypothesis about why knowledge might be sensitive to the 
outside/inside difference. According to some recent philosophical theories, the ordinary concept 
of knowledge can be roughly defined as a justified true belief (e.g. Chisholm, 1989). However, 
this “justified true belief” approach has been heavily criticized and there is now a broad consensus 
that it fails to capture the ordinary concept (for reviews, see Ichikawa & Steup, 2012; Turri, 2012).  
In response to these developments, some theorists have proposed a radically different approach to 
the ordinary concept of knowledge, according to which knowledge is a representation of a fact 
caused or explained by the fact itself (e.g. Goldman, 1967; Turri, 2015). On this approach, 
knowledge involves, first and foremost, the detection of truths, either directly through perception 
or indirectly through competent inference from other known facts. That is, knowledge essentially 
involves the operation of cognitive mechanisms to detect and retain information. It need not always 
be based on or constituted by belief or justification, as those categories are ordinarily understood. 
 The results from the present studies suggest a possible point of convergence with these 
developments in the theory of knowledge. People’s thinking about causation is sensitive to the 
outside/inside difference (Sloman & Lagnado, 2015). When making causal judgments, people do 
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not merely generate representations of variables linked by conditional probabilities. Instead, they 
also generate representations of the structure of relevant events and the mechanisms relating them 
to other events. This broadly corresponds to the difference between outside and inside information, 
as discussed above. If the concept of knowledge does essentially involve causation or mechanism 
— as the theories described in the previous paragraph suggest — then the outside/inside effect on 
knowledge judgments might be a special instance of the outside/inside effect on causal judgments 
more generally. That is, when we make knowledge attributions, we do not merely represent the 
person as having certain beliefs or evidence. Instead, we represent the person as being in an 
informational state with a certain causal or explanatory etiology. 
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